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COMES NOW, the Appellant, Boise Tower Associates, LLC (hereinafter "BTA"), by 
and through its attorney of record, Eric S. Rossman, and hereby submits Appellant's Reply 
BrieUCross-Repondent's Brief on appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
On March 28, 2008, PlaintifUAppellant Boise Tower Associates, LLC ("BTA") filed 
its Opening Brief on Appeal against the DefendantsIAppellees, the City of Boise ("the City") 
and Timothy Hogland ("Hogland"), arguing that the district court erred in granting the 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity. On May 16,2008, 
Respondents filed their Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Brief asserting that the 
District Court properly granted the motion for summary judgment and fkther asserting that 
the District Court erred in denying the City's motion for attorney fees. BTA now submits 
this Reply Brief on Appeal and Cross-Respondent's Brief and respectfully requests that the 
Court (a) reverse the denial by the District Court of its summary judgment motion and direct 
that partial summary judgment be entered that Hogland and the City are liable under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in depriving BTA of its procedural due process rights, reserved lo trial the 
determination of damages; (b) reverse the grant of summary judgment dismissing the other 
claims of BTA, and (c) affirm the District Court's decision denying an award of attorney fees 
to the City and deny the City's request for fees on appeal. 
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11. ARGUMENT. 
A. BTA's Damage Claim is Not Within the Scope of this Appeal. 
In the first seven pages of its responsive brief, the City argues that BTA could have 
mitigated its damages and that BTA allegedly failed to comply with its discovery obligations 
by "dumping" 109 pages of documents. There was no motion filed in the trial court, 
however, complaining about BTA's response to the City's discovery requests, much less an 
appeal of any ruling to this Court. Moreover, the City did not move to dismiss BTA's claim 
because of BTA's supposed failure to mitigate its damages but instead because of the City's 
purported immunity. As the trial court noted in its decision denying the City's motion for 
attorneys' fees: 
Boise City made a decision to pursue summary judgment based 
on immunity and not other grounds. This was a calculated risk 
taken by Boise City and the Court is unwilling to speculate on 
what could have happened had the other issues been raised. 
Moreover, hypothetically speaking, simply because a party is 
able to mitigate the damages or the damages were minimal does 
not nullify the alleged wrong by the governmental entity. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 00132-00133. 
B. The Stop Work Order Was NotIssued Because of Safety Concerns. 
Throughout its brief, the City argues that the Stop Work Order issued by the Building 
Department on November 8, 2002, or one day after Mortenson's letter advising the 
Department of its intention to resume construction, was "solely in response to the hazard that 
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existed by reason of the open excavation site of the Boise Tower Project and the fact that 
BTA's permit had expired." City Brief, p. 9. 
Although Hogland in his affidavit belatedly states that he was concerned about safety 
issues at the construction site (R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 9 (Affidavit of Timothy J. Hogland), 7 
lo), there is no evidence in the record that any of those alleged concerns were ever 
communicated to BTA. In fact, at no time during the discussions between Hogland and 
Peterson was there ever any communication by Hogland about safety issues at the site. R. 
Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16 (Second Affidavit of Frederick Peterson in Support of Boise Tower's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Surnmary Judgment and Reply in 
Support of Boise Tower's Motion for Summary Judgment), 7 2. In his deposition, Hogland 
admitted that he never gave BTA notice about any safety issues at the construction site that 
would have provided an independent ground for the revocation of the building permit. 
A: I think I could [revoke a building permit] if there was 
something extremely hazardous in the project and we felt 
like it wasn't going to be taken care of, we couldn't get 
anybody to remedy the problem, then we could have 
taken some action. 
Q: Before you would take an action like that though, of 
course, you would give notice of the extreme hazard; is 
that true? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you would give them an opportunity to at least 
remedy the problem; true? 
A: True. 
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Q: To the best of you recollection, you didn't advise BTA of 
any extreme hazards which were existing in that 180-day 
period, did you? 
A: No. 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2 (Affidavit of Christopher Burke in Support of Boise Tower's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment), Ex. A (transcript of deposition of Timothy Hogland), p. 134, 
L1. 7-22. 
Moreover, the fact that Hogland's safety concerns are only a recently fashioned 
pretext for Hogland's actions are confirmed by both the timing of the stop work order, the 
text of the Stipulation Agreement, and the letter from Hogland later terminating the permit. 
Even though Hogland was supposedly concerned about "an open construction pit in the 
downtown of Boise which had been sitting idle for many months" (City Brief, p. 30), he 
issued a stop work order one day after receiving notice from Mortenson that construction 
would resume to close the pit. The Stipulation Agreement nowhere addresses any safety 
issues or any conditions imposed on BTA to address any safety concerns.' Hogland's letter 
of February 11, 2003, terminating the permit states, as the only ground for the termination, 
the absence of an acceptable financing commitment. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 9, Ex. L. Indeed, 
as admitted by Hogland in his deposition, all conditions of the Stipulation Agreement had 
been satisfied by BTA except for the financing. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 209, LL. 
' The City incorrectly asserts in its brief, p. 19, that the Stipulation addressed "rusting of steel bars and beams, in 
addition to the lateral support for surrounding properly." There are no provisions in the Stipulation on those issues. 
R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 9, Ex. I. 
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C. The Stipulation Agreement is Void. 
The City attempts to distinguish Black v. City of Ketchum, 122 Idaho 302, 834 P.2d 
304 (1992), on the basis of footnote 3 in the court's decision. That footnote reads: 
The City of Ketchum commingles the Local Planning Act, title 
67, chapter 65, Idaho Code, with the argument concerning the 
power to impose conditions upon the vacation of an alley. The 
Local Planning Act, however, deals with zoning powers. The 
situation we face is the vacation of an alley, to which the 
legislature has specifically spoken in I.C. $ 50-3 1 1. 
The City then argues that because the Local Planning Act authorizes the City to 
establish standards for the construction of buildings, Hogland had the authority to enter into 
the Stipulation Agreement to address safety concerns. The argument is specious. As in 
Black, the City, by adopting the UBC, has already spoken about when a building permit 
expires and when it can be revoked. There was no authority to attach other conditions to the 
building permit and accordingly the Stipulation Agreement was ultra vires. Moreover, as 
shown above, the alleged safety concerns were not the motivation for the Stipulation 
Agreement. 
Nor was there any consideration for the Stipulation Agreement. The City argues that 
the consideration was the "City foregoing its right to take other actions to abate BTA's 
violations" (City Brief, p. 30). There is no evidence in the record of any violations by BTA 
under the building permit. The only purported quid pro quo was Hogland's rescission of a 
wrongfully issued stop work order and his concurrent threat to tell the City Council that the 
building permit had expired if the Stipulation Agreement was not signed. 
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D. An Issued Building Permit is a Protected Property Interest. 
The City argues that a property interest does not exist where an applicant is applying 
for a permit or license and the issuing agency has discretion to deny the application. The 
City then argues, without any citation to or support of the record, that BTA in connection 
with its application for a permit: 
did not submit all plans, calculations and drawings. Instead 
BTA was operating under a partial permit. Because the UBC 
only provides that such permits "may" be issued, the decision to 
do so is discretionary. 
City Brief, p. 16. 
The City's next step is to accordingly distinguish the clear holding of 3883 
Connecticut LLC v. District of Columbia, 336 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003), that an issued 
building permit is a protected property interest by arguing that 
that case is silent on whether a final permit would necessarily 
follow, or if there was discretion as to issuing a final permit. In 
this case, the UBC is clear that the partial permit is discretionary 
and there is no guarantee that a final permit will be issued. 
City Brief, p. 16, fh. 9. 
The City's argument is frivolous. What discretion the City originally had to not issue 
the building permit to BTA is not relevant to this case. The building permit was, in fact, 
issued by the Department and is in the record. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. 5 1. Because the 
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buildig permit cannot now be suspended or revoked at the mere discretion of the City but 
only for the specific reasons stated in the UBC, it is a protected property interesL2 
Nor is the building permit less of a protected property interest because the City has 
labeled it a "partial permit" and argues, without support, that not all the necessary plans for 
the permit were submitted by BTA. The building permit issued by the Department allows 
the construction of a "new 387,380 sq. ft. 25 story with 18,800 sq. ft  basement shell and core 
building." The permit expressly excludes plumbing, electrical, mechanical, fire suppressions 
systems and tenant improvements, which would be reviewed and approved later by the 
Department. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. 51. To what extent the Department has the 
discretion to deny applications for those later permits is also not relevant to BTA's claim that 
the shell and core permit that was, in fact, issued by the Department was wrongfully revoked. 
Nor were the plans that were submitted by BTA somehow less than what was 
required to obtain a shell and core permit. Hogland admitted that before the permit was 
issued, he was satisfied that the application, the plans, and all related documents conformed 
to code requirements, laws, and ordinances of the City. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, p. 76, 
line 25 - p. 77, line 6. 
E. BTA Was Not Provided with Due Process. 
The City argues that it was not necessary to provide BTA with a pre-deprivation 
hearing before the stop work order was issued, citing 3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of 
Under UBC Section 106.4.5, a buiidii permit may only be suspended or revoked if the permit was issued in error 
or on the basis of incorrect information supplied or in violation of any ordinance or regulation. 
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Columbia, supra. In that case, however, the court expressly recognized that a stop work 
order without a pre-deprivation hearing was permissible because the District had a significant 
interest in acting swiftly to immediately halt construction work that poses a threat to public 
health and safety or to the environment. Secondly, the regulations provided for three levels 
of an expedited post-deprivation review. 
As noted above, in the instant case, there was no threat to public health, safety, or the 
environment. There was also no need to act swiftly. Construction had ceased at the site on 
May 15, 2002; no action was taking by the Department until the day after notice was 
provided that construction would resume. 
There was also no review provided in the UBC or any other applicable regulations. 
See, BTA's Opening Brief, p. 21-22 The City merely cites Section 105 of the UBC in 
arguing that BTA could have appealed to the City Council. Section 105.1, however, only 
provides a right of appeal to the Board of Appeals. The City moreover fails to address the 
fact that Section 105.3 expressly excludes a right of appeal even to the Board of Appeals on 
the administrative provisions of Chapter 1. The trial court below also recognized that 
"neither the Boise City Code nor the UBC provided for an immediate appeal following an 
expiration of a permit." R. Vol. I, p. 000089. 
The court in 3883 Connecticut LLC distinguished its prior decision in Tri-County 
Industries v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1997), where a building permit 
was suspended because of public opposition to a decontamination facility and a government 
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official's incorrect representation that a public housing project would be constructed adjacent 
to the facility: 
We analogized that action to the issuance of a SWO because the 
two have similar effects, and held that the "oral order of 
suspension" violated due process because it was not based on 
"formal evidence" and the only review was by the Board of 
Appeals and Review - single step appeal process that did not 
guarantee prompt resolution. 
3883 Connecticut LLC v. District of Columbia, supra, at 1074, fn. 5. 
In Tri-County, the court had evaluated the procedures in the District of Columbia 
under the tripartite test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19 (1976). The court held that the 
property interest, the suspended building permit, was substantial and that the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation was high. There was no formal evidence presented to the building 
official; it was a classic case of "shooting from the hip." Finally, the government interest in 
a swift action was negligible. There was sufficient time to permit the developer to challenge 
the building official's assumptions. 
Both Tri-County and 3883 Connecticut LLC make clear that even in the 
circumstances where a property interest can be deprived without a prior hearing because of 
the need for immediate governmental action, the courts will review the existing regulatory 
scheme to determine whether a prompt post-deprivation hearing is provided by applicable 
ordinances. It is not a sufficient post-deprivation remedy that a city council of a jurisdiction 
makes an ad hoc decision to hear an appeal. In this instant case, there is both the absence of 
any facts which would justify a suspension or termination of the building permit without a 
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prior hearing and the absence of any provision in the UBC or other ordinances establishing a 
prompt post-deprivation review. 
The Ninth Circuit case of Weinberg v. Whatcorn County, 241 F.3d 746 (gfi Cir. 2001), 
cited in the City Brief at p. 18, is also instructive on the requirement for a pre-deprivation 
hearing. In that case, Weinberg, a developer, had received approval from the County for his 
short plats and had also received permits from the County for clearing, fill and grading of the 
property. On August 19, 2004, a dispute arose over Weinberg's removal of vegetation and 
right to place fill material in a buffer area. The County land use manager told Weinberg to 
desist from dumping fill or he would issue a stop work order. Weinberg continued his 
activities and, on August 25, 1994, a stop work order was issued prohibiting clearing, 
grading and filling in the buffer area. On September 14, 1994, another County official sent a 
letter to Weinberg stating that the County would vacate his short plats unless Weinberg paid 
fines, re-vegetated the buffer area, and took other erosion control measures. ARer Weinberg 
advised the County that he would not comply with the measures, the County revoked the 
short plats. 
Weinberg filed suit and moved for summary judgment of liability for denial of his due 
process rights. The district court instead granted the County's concurrent motion for 
dismissal on the ground that Weinberg had presented no evidence of damages. 
The Nmth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although Weinberg had no 
actual damages, a due process claim is still actionable for nominal damages. As to 
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Weinberg's summary judgment motion, the court held that the permits and short plat 
approvals were a protected property interest entitled to due process. As to the stop work 
order, the court ruled that questions of fact remained on whether swift action was needed due 
to Weinberg's alleged creation of a soil erosion and water contamination emergency. 
However, as to the revocation of the short plats, there was no question of fact and summary 
judgment in favor of Weinburg was appropriate: 
On the other hand, no such factual issues remain unresolved 
with respect to the County's vacation of Weinberg's approved 
plats. The Mathews factors clearly weigh in favor of a pre- 
deprivation hearing in these circumstances. Weinberg's private 
interest in his approved plats was considerable. By vacating the 
plats, the County effectively deprived Weinberg of the 
economic value of his property and rendered nugatory his prior 
efforts and expenses incurred to develop it. There was a marked 
absence of any alternative procedural safeguards, as well. Not 
only did the County's Technical Committee vacate Weinberg's 
short plats without providing him a prior opportunity to be 
heard, it did so without holding a Committee meeting of any 
kind. The attendant risk of an erroneous determination by the 
Committee was, accordingly, significant. With respect to the 
third Mathaos factor, providmg Weinberg an informal hearing 
prior to the deprivation would have entailed only minor 
administrative costs and burdens for the County. 
Weinberg v. Whatcorn County, supra, at 754. 
The City also argues that BTA, in fact, had a hearing with Hogland shortly aRer the 
issuance of the stop work order. City Brief, p. 20. Even ignoring that the meetings occurred 
after the issuance of the stop work order, those meetings cannot in any event be considered 
any form of "due process" that considered the validity of the stop work order. BTA 
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requested in the meetings that Hogland investigate the City records to determine whether any 
records existed to show that work had been performed within the preceding 180 days. 
Hogland r e h e d 3  The only discussion by Hogland was that no work could resume until the 
Stipulation Agreement was signed and if it was not signed, he would publicly announce the 
expiration of the building permit. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3 (Affidavit of Fredrick Peterson in 
Support of Boise Tower's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), 7 10 and 11. Hogland 
candidly admits in his deposition that Peterson told him that he did not want to sign the 
Agreement on the advice of his counsel. Hogland also admits that Peterson signed the 
Apsement only after Hogland told him that if did not execute the Agreement, Hogland 
wqdd tell the City Council that the building permit had expired R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Fx. 
A,p. 155,line 19-p. 156, line 11. 
The meetings were merely a coercive process for Hogland to obtain execution of lhe 
Stipulation Agreement. Based on the tripartite test of Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, the 
requirements of due process were clearly not satisfied by the meetings. Procedural due 
process requires instead that a govemnental agency seeking to deprive a person of a property 
interest must afford the holder of that interest notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a 
The City argues that "at the meeting, BTA failed to provide any documentation to refute the fact that the 180 day 
period had expired." City Brief, p. 20 There is no evidence in the record that suggests that BTA had possession of 
the May 15, 2002 MTI inspection report. Hogland admitted, however, in his deposition that Hogland himself had 
reviewed the report before he terminated the building permit on February 11,2003. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 2, Ex. A, 
p. 212,line4-p. 213, line 14. 
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meaninghl time and in a meaningful manner7'. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 
Idaho 63,73 (2001); Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,91(1999). 
The City argues nevertheless that "an informal meeting with the decision-maker is 
sufficient to satisfy due process," citing Weinberg v. Whatcom County, supra, at 753. City 
Brief, p. 18. However, the Wienberg statement relied upon by the City is a quote from 
Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Div v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,443, fn. 17 (1978), which states in 
h l l  that "[tlhe opportunity of informal consultation with designated personnel empowered to 
correct a mistaken determination constitutes a "due process hearing' in appropriate 
circumstances." The Supreme Court, in turn, cites Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974). In 
that case, the Court held that a short 10-day suspension of a student fkom school would 
require at least an informal hearing before the suspension took place and that the due process 
clause in that context would not require an opportunity to secure counsel, confront and cross 
examine witnesses and to call a student's own witnesses. The Court, however, expressly 
noted that its decision was limited to short suspensions not exceeding 10 days and that longer 
suspensions or expulsions may require more formal proceedings. 
The City also ignores that, after the Stipulation Agreement was signed and prior to 
Hogland's letter of February 11, 2003 terminating the building permit, there was no meeting 
or any hearing of any kind even though ETA, in its letter of January 21,2003, had requested 
Hogland for an opportunity to respond if Hogland disapproved any loan commitment. R. 
Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3, Ex. F. The City incorrectly asserts (City Brief, p. 21) that the parties 
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had conferred because Hogland on January 22, 2003 had entered into an addendum 
extending the timelines in the Stipulation Agreement. The addendum, however, was simply 
presented to Peterson for his signature. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 3 ,7  14. There is no evidence 
in the record suggesting any meeting or hearing on Hogland's decision to terminate the 
permit because of inadequate financing. 
F. Hogland Is Both the Final Decisionmaker and the Final Policymaker on 
Issues of Permit Expiration and Revocation. 
The City argues that Boise City Code 93-05-02 "only grants the Director of PDS (i.e., 
Hogland) the authority to formulate and recommend policies, and to implement and enforce 
adopted policies and procedures with the approval of the Mayor and City Council." City 
Brief, p. 25. The City does not respond to BTA's opening brief that it is necessary to analyze 
whether Hogland had fmal policymaking authority with respect to the particular issue of 
permit expiration and revocation. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978.983 (9*' Cir. 2004)(When 
determining whether an individual has final policymaking authority, we ask whether he or 
she has authority in ' a  particular area, or on a particular issue"', citing McMillian v. 
Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997)(emphasis in original)). 
All of Hogland's actions in this case were based on his authority to determine the 
expiration date of a building permit under Chapter 1 of the UBC. Section 3-05-02(M) 
provides that Hogland is "responsible for all hct ions  assigned by law to the building 
official, to oversee the building plans review/inspection activities of the City, and to issue 
permits in conformity with the applicable building inspection laws and codes". Similarly, 
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Section 5 3-05-02(Q) provides that Hogland must "perform or cause to be performed all 
duties required by this code or other law of the building official and/or planning director." 
Section 104.2 of the UBC, in turn, explicitly confers policymaking authority on the Building 
Official with respect to building code provisiops. That section authorizes and directs the 
Building Official to enforce the code and grants the Building Official the power to "render 
interpretations of this code and to adopt and enforce rules and supplemental regulations in 
order to clarify the application of its provisions." 
Because the provisions of Chapter 1 of +e UBC are not subject to review and because 
yogland had the express policymaking authority to ad@ and enforce rules on permit 
expiration issues, Hogland is both the final decisionmaker and final policypaker, which 
subjects the City to liability for his actions. That liability is not based on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior but instead because the decisions of Hogland in this area were, in fact, 
the decisions of the City. 
G. Hogland Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity. 
Hogland argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the "the majority of 
courts, including the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, focus upon whether the enabling legislation 
gives the building official discretion to grant or deny the permit." City Brief, p. 27. Hogland 
then suggests that there is conflict among the circuits because the District Court of Appeals 
ih 3883 Connecticut LLC, supra, recognized that an issued building permit is a protected 
property right. As noted above, the question in this case is not whether Hogland had the 
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discretion not to issue the building permit to BTA. The building permit was in fact issued 
and could not be later revoked in the discretion of Hogland. Moreover, there is no conflict 
among the circuits that an issued permit is a protected properly right. Hogland has not 
provided any citation of a case to the contrary. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit case, Weinberg v. 
Whatcom County, supra, cited by the City, also conf i is  that an issued permit is a protected 
property right. See also, Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd in 
part on other grounds by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 131 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)(city 
official's claim of qualified immunity rejected, holding officials charged with enforcing the 
housing code should have known of the clearly established right to a pre-deprivation 
hearing). 
H. Questions of Fact Exist on BTA's Taking Claim Which Preclude 
Summary Judgment. 
The City argues that Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg? Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002), precludes as a matter of law BTA's taking claim. In that case, the 
Court rejected a categorical rule that any temporary moratorium on development was a 
taking of properly. The Court expressly noted that the result might have been different "if 
petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead 
of making a facial challenge, some of them might have prevailed under the Penn Central 
analysis." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, supra at 33 1. 
The fact that a temporary interference by the state with property rights may constitute 
a taking was confirmed by the Supreme Court in First Lutheran Church v. Los Angles 
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County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In that case, the Court rejected the argument that 
compensation for a taking is not due for the interim loss of the right to develop property 
during the period of time preceding the date of the invalidation of an ordinance. 
Accordingly, the question of whether BTA has a viable taking claim during the period of 
time its building permit was suspended depends on the fact intensive inquiry required by 
Penn Central and accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the City on this claim wcts 
inappropriate. 
The City cites Intermountain West v. Boise City, 11 1 Idaho 878,728 P.2d 767 (1986), 
in support of its argument that the City's termination of BTA's building permit is not a 
temporary taking. However, the basis for the court's holding in Intermountain West was that 
"the circumstances in this case indicate the properly retained residual value despite any 
damage that may have been done by respondent's actions." Id., supra at 880. In this case, 
there were no facts presented by the City on its sumary  judgment motion indicating that 
there existed some residual interest in the property during the suspension of BTA's building 
permit. 
The City also argues that BTA has no taking claim because ETA did not have a 
property interest in its building permit, there was no taking of physical property for public 
use, and the issue was not ripe. City Brief, p. 31. As argued above, the building permit 
issued to BTA is clearly a protected property interest. BTA's taking claim is not based on a 
physical taking, but instead a regulatory taking by the City; moreover, there is no need to 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEFICROSS-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17 
show a public use. "[Nleither a physical appropriation nor a public use has ever been a 
necessary component of a 'regulatory taking"'. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, supra at 326 
The doctrine of ripeness simply does not apply to this case. The building permit was issued, 
revoked and reinstated after City Council review. 
1. Questions of Fact Exist on BTA's State Law Tort Claims Against Hogland 
which Preclude Summary Judgment. 
1. - BTA has vrovided evidence sufficient to demonstrate that genuine 
issues o f  material fact remain remrding whether Hogland acted with 
malice and is therefore not entitled to immunity vursuant to Idaho 
Code 6 6-904/3/. 
The City argues that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to 
Hogland based on the immunity provided by Idaho Code § 6-904(3) because there was no 
evidence that Hogland acted with "ill-will" when he issued the Stop Work Order and ordered 
the revocation of BTA's building permit. However, as was fully set forth within BTA's 
opening brief on appeal, there was more than sufficient evidence presented to the District 
Court to establish at least an issue of fact regarding whether Hogland acted with ill-will 
towards BTA in this matter. 
The City argues that Hogland did not have ill-will because he chose to grant an earlier 
extension of the building permit and because he chose to extend the permit under a 
stipulation agreement when he, allegedly, could have treated the open construction site as a 
public nuisance and abated the condition under the Dangerous Building Code. However, this 
argument completely ignores the fact that the UBC expressly allows extension of a 
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building permit and, therefore, when Hogland granted the first extension, he was simply 
complying with the provisions of the UBC. UBC 3 106.4.4. This argument further ignores 
the fact that it is not Hogland's intent at the time the original extension was granted that 
matters, it is his state of mind and intent at the time he revoked the building permit that is 
relevant to this lawsuit. Finally, the City's assertion that Hogland extended the permit under 
a stipulation when he could have treated the open construction site as a public nuisance 
ignores the fact that the stipulation was unlawful the undisputed fact that BTA's building 
permit had expired at the time Hogland forced BTA to sign the stipulation. Finally, this 
argument does not take into account that Hogland revoked the BTA building permit despite 
his knowledge that the BTA permit had not expired when he issued the stop work order and, 
therefore, his pretext for stopping work and coercing BTA into signing the stipulation 
agreement was wrong and without legal authority. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,7 3 1. Revoking a 
permit based upon the expiration of an unlawful stipulation which, in turn, was coerced as a 
result of a false assertion that the permit had expired and with knowledge that the permit had 
not, in fact, expired, is certainly sufficient evidence to show ill-will by Hogland towards 
BTA. 
The City also argues that the rest of the evidence submitted simply shows a dedicated 
public official at work. While that may be one interpretation, it is certainly not the only one 
and considering these facts as a whole, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hogland's acts 
in stopping work on the project without legal authority, in declaring that BTA's building 
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permit had expired, when it had not, in threatening BTA with public disclosure of the 
permit's expiration unless BTA executed the stipulation, advising BTA that the City would 
reinstate the building permit if BTA signed the stipulation, when it had no authority to do so 
if the permit had in fact expired, and in revoking BTA's valid, unexpired permit for failing to 
satisfy conditions which H o g i d  had no legal qpthority to impose in the first place and after 
he had actual knowledge that the permit bad not expired, were wrongful and unlawful, and 
committed wi+out legal justification or excuse. For these reaspns, material disputes of fact 
exist on the issue of whether Hogland was acting with malice andlor criminal intent4 and the 
@ q ~ t  by the District Court of Hogland's motion for summary judgment on the stqte law 
immwity issue must be reversed. 
2. Hogland is not entitled to immunim under Idaho Code 6 6-904B/3). -
The City asserts that Hogland is also entitled to immunity under Idaho Code 5 6- 
904B(3) because BTA has not proven malice or criminal intent reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct. As has been set forth previously, BTA can establish malice andlor criminal 
intent, therefore the issue of reckless, willful or wanton conduct is irrelevant. However, if 
BTA were required to prove recklessness, the evidence provided to the District Court clearly 
The City argues that BTA has asserted an incorrect standard for establishing criminal intent. However, Idaho 
Code 5 6-904(3) does not require BTA demonstrate malice criminal intent only one or the other. Therefore, 
because BTA has established malice ('511-will"), criminal intent is irrelevant. Furthermore, BTA specifically asserts 
that the evidence set fa& within its opening brief fully demonstrates that Hogland acted with specific intent to 
engage in activities he h e w  to be unlawful under the City building codes. As such, he did have the requisite 
criminal intent. 
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establishes at least a genuine issue of fact regardmg whether Hogland's conduct was 
reckless, willful or wanton. 
The City specifically asserts that Hogland's knowledge of the construction contract 
with Mortenson is irrelevant because it was not pled in the complaint. However, a review of 
the Complaint demonstrates that Paragraph 15 of the Complaint expressly states that 
Mortenson was the general contractor for the Boise Tower project and notified the City on 
November 7,2002 that it was ready to begin work on the project. See R Vol. I ,  p. 000013. 
Thus, knowledge of the construction contract between Mortenson and BTA was, in fact, pled 
in the complaint. Furthermore, even if the existence of that contract was not specifically pled 
in the complaint, Hogland's interference with contract and interference with a prospective 
economic advantage was certainly pled. Therefore, the evidence provided relates directly to 
an "issue" pled in the complaint. Contrary to the City's assertions, Edmondson v. Shearer 
Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 176, 75 P.3d 733, 737 (2003) does not hold that every 
factual issue must be pled in the complaint to be a material issue of fact. Rather, Edrnonson 
simply held that where an employee was clearly an at-will employee, issues related to the 
reasons for the plaintiff's discharge were irrelevant except to the extent they demonstrated 
that the employee had met the public policy exception to at-will employment which, in turn, 
was a question of law for the Court. See id. Therefore, the evidence regarding Hogland's 
knowledge of the Mortenson contract is certainly relevant. 
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Additionally, the City assets that the evidence of recklessness provided in relation to 
the attempts at obtaining financing from Marshall Investment Group does not demonstrate 
knowledge of specific harm because there is no evidence that Hogland knew the details of 
BTA's negotiations with Marshall. However, the evidence provided to the District Court 
demonstrates that Hogland knew BTA was working with Marshall Investment Group trying 
to obtain a loan to finance construction of the Project because BTA furnished Hogland with a 
written loan commitment from Marshall on January 10,2003 for the City's review. R. Vol. I, 
p. 142, Ex. 5, 77 24-26. Further, the evidence demonstrates that when Hogland threatened 
BTA in November 2002 with public disclosure that BTA's building permit had expired, Rick 
Peterson told Hogland such an announcement would do serious damage to the project. 
Peterson also told Hogland at that time that canceling the building permit would jeopardize 
BTA's financing and cause it to lose condominium pre-sales. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 7 21. 
Peterson f m l y  believed that public disclosure that the building permit had expired would 
cause the project to come to an abrupt end. Id. 
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that Hogland's revocation of the building permit 
and the adverse publicity surrounding it, did in fact lead to cancellation of presale 
condominium agreements and withdrawal of financing efforts by Marshall. It also caused 
Mortenson and its subcontractors to cease further work on the Project. The Project could not 
recover from this action by Hogland, and came to an end. R Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,7 34; R. 
Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16, 7 3. Thus, the evidence shows that Hogland had knowledge of the 
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Marshall financing, had knowledge of the affect that his actions would have on the project 
and the financing, and nevertheless unlawfblly revoked the building permit. As such, these 
facts, and all inferences which must be drawn from them in BTA's favor, are sufficient to 
create factual disputes on the issue of whether Hogland's conduct outlined above was 
reckless, willfbl and wanton, and therefore whether the immunity afforded Hogland by I.C. 5 
6-904B(3) may be abrogated. Therefore, the District Court's decision granting summary 
judgment to Hogland based on the immunity provisions of the Idaho Torts Claim Act must 
be reversed. 
3. - Hogland was not entitled to summary judgment even without immunity. 
Finally, the City asserts that, irrespective of immunity provided by the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, Hogland was entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that 
Hogland intentionally interfered with BTA's contracts and its prospective economic 
advantage. First, it should be noted that the District Court never reached this issue because 
the District Court dismissed the claims solely on the grounds of immunity. See R Vol. I, pp. 
000094-000098. However, should the Court decide to address this issue, there are issues of 
fact remaining regarding whether Hogland intentionally interfered with BTA's contractual 
and prospective economic advantage rights. The evidence presented to the District Court 
demonstrates that: 
a. Hogland knew and understood BTA was pre-selling condominium units to 
purchasers prior to obtaining construction financing for the Project. The Marshall loan 
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commitment hrnished to Hogland by BTA on January 10,2003, which Hogland and the City 
reviewed for approval, required BTA to pre-sell a certain number of condominium units as a 
condition of loan funding. Rick Peterson of BTA had conversations with Hogland prior to 
the revocation of the building permit revocation regarding the adverse effect a permit 
revocation would have on condominium pre-sales. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 44 21,24-26. 
b. When Hogland threatened BTA in November 2002 with public disclosure that 
BTA's buildmg permit had expired, Rick Peterson told Hogland such an announcement 
would do serious damage to the project. Peterson also told Hogland at that time that 
canceling the building permit would jeopardize BTA's financing and cause it to lose 
condominium pre-sales. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5, 7 21. Peterson f m l y  believed that public 
disclosure that the building permit had expired would cause the project to come to an abrupt 
end. Id. 
c. Hogland's revocation of the building permit and the adverse publicity 
surrounding it, did in fact lead to cancellation of presale condominium agreements and 
withdrawal of financing efforts by Marshall. It also caused Mortenson and its subcontractors 
to cease further work on the Project. The Project could not recover fkom this action by 
Hogland, and came to an end. R. Vol. I, p. 142, Ex. 5,434; R Vol. I, p. 143, Ex. 16,43. 
The evidence provided above demonstrates that Hogland had knowledge of the 
presale condominium contracts. Contrary to the City's arguments, there is no requirement 
that BTA prove that Hogland had knowledge of all of the details of the contracts, only that 
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Hogland had knowledge of the existence of the contracts, which he clearly did. The 
evidence fhrther demonstrates that Hogland had knowledge of BTA's construction contract 
with Mortenson and its proposed financial arrangements with Marshall. The evidence also 
demonstrates that the revocation of the building permit and the adverse publicity surrounding 
the revocation did lead to the cancellation of a number of BTA's presale condominium 
agreements as well as the loss of financing &om Marshall. Further, as has been set forth 
numerous times, there is evidence of intent by Hogland. At the time the building permit was 
revoked, Hogland knew that it had not expired due to lack of work on the project, but he 
revoked the permit anyway. The only intent was to prevent any further work on the project 
which, by necessity would result in the breach of the condominium presales agreements and, 
as Hogland was aware, the loss of financing. Thus, BTA has demonstrated intent by 
Hogland. As such, Hogland was not entitled to summary judgment on BTA's state law tort 
claims. 
J. The Trial Court Properly Denied the City's Motion for an Award of 
Attorneys Fees. 
1. - Standard o f  Review. 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, subject 
to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744,753,86 P.3d 
458, 467 (2004). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court 
considers (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted withim the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
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with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Nampa Charter School, Inc. v. 
DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23,29,89 P.3d 863,869 (2004). 
2. - The City is not entitled to attorney fees in this matter. 
a. Standard for an Award of Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
42 U.S.C. 5 1988 allows a court, in its discretion, to award the prevailing party, other 
than the U.S. Government, a reasonable attorneys fee as part of its costs in connection with 
Federal Civil Rights claims. The standard by which fees are awarded, however, differs 
significantly depending upon on whether a defendant or a plaintiff has prevailed. White v. 
South Park Independent School District, 693 Fed 2"d 1163 (5a Cir. 1982). "[A] prevailing 
plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorneys fees in all but special circumstances." 
Christians Berg Garment Company v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978) (emphasis in 
original). 
In contrast, a prevailing defendant may not be awarded attorneys fees under § 1988 
unless the court finds that plaintiffs action was meritless in the sense that it was groundless 
or without foundation. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980), Christians Berg, 434 U.S. 
at 416. "Plaintiff should not be assessed his opponents attorneys fees unless the court finds 
his claim was frivolous, unreasonable. or eroundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate 
after it clearly became so." Instead, "[A] prevailing defendant may recover an attorney fee 
(under 5 1988) only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or 
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embarrass the defendant." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). The fact that a 
plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the 
assessment of fees. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 14-15. 
This standard imposed on prevailing defendants under 5 1988 is meant to ensure that 
no "chilling effect" is imposed upon plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their civil rights who 
might otherwise be hesitant to file suit for fear of a large fee award against them. 
Vandenplus v. City of Muskego, 797 Fed 425,429 (7" Cir. 1986). 
b. Idaho Code 8 6-918A Standard. 
Idaho Code 5 6-918A applies to claims made under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. It 
states in pertinent part: "at the time and in the manner provided for fixing costs and civil 
actions, and at the discretion of the trial court, appropriate and reasonable attorney fees may 
be awarded to the claimant, the government entity or the employee of such government 
entity, as costs, in actions under this act, upon petition therefor and a showing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty 
of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action". 
(emphasis added) 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated in Bissett v. Un-named Member of Political 
Compact, 11 1 Idaho 1863,865,727 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 1986), this bad faith standard 
is an exceptionally rigorous standard. In Bissett, the appeals court ruled that even though it 
believed that the appeal was taken "on dubious grounds, we do not think it warrants a fee 
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award under the statute". Bissett, 11 1 Idaho at 865. Significantly, Idaho Code 5 6-918A 
exclusively governs "any right to recover attorneys fees in an action for money damages 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act". Tort claims asserted under the ITCA are not subject to 
"any other statute or rule of the court, except as expressly and specifically provided or 
authorized by duly enacted statute of the State of Idaho". Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 24, 
773 P. 2nd 290,292 (Ct. App. 1989). 
c. Idaho Code 9 12-117 Standard. 
Idaho Code 5 12-117 which applies to non-tort civil proceedings against a state 
agency or city not otherwise covered by the Idaho Tort Claims Act, also sets a rigorous 
standard for entitlement for attorneys fees. It provides, in part, "the court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court 
finds that the party against whom the judgment is entered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law." See Fischer v. City of Ketchurn, 141 Idaho 349,355-56, 109 P. 3d 1091 (2005); 
Packard v. Joint School District No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 661 P. 2d 770 (1983) (emphasis 
added) The purposes of IC 5 12-1 17 are: I) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary 
actions; and 2) to provide a remedy to persons who have borne unfair and unjustified 
financial burdens defending against groundless (government) charges or attempting to 
correct mistakes (government) agencies should never have made." State, Department of 
Finance v. Resource Service Company, Inc., 134 Idaho 282,283,l P. 31d 783,784 (2000). 
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A defense or claim is not frivolous or groundless, for purposes of awarding attorneys 
fees, merely because a party loses. Lowery v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada 
County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P.2d 431 (1988). Where questions of law are raised, attorneys 
fees should not be awarded unless the non-prevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, 
and, therefore, not fairly debatable position. Id. 
d. Idaho Code (i 12-117 is Not Applicable to the 
Claims/Defenses at Issue in This Case. 
Idaho Code S; 12-1 17 is a general statute applicable to attorney fee awards in civil 
proceedings against cities and state agencies generally. In contrast, Idaho Code S; 6-918A, 
and 42 USC S; 1988, are specific attorney fees statutes applicable to claims under the Idaho 
Tort Claims Actmd the U.S. Civil Rights Act, 42 USC S; 1983, specifically. Idaho Code S; 6- 
918A is the aorney fees statute applicable to claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, 
Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho at 124, 773 P.2d at 292, and 42 USC S; 1988, being a specific 
statute governing claims under the U.S. Civil Rights Act, controls over other statutes of 
general application, such as IC S; 12-1 17. State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84, 375 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (1962) ("Where there is a general statute, and a special or specific statute, dealing with 
the same subject, the provisions of the special or specific statute will control those of the 
general statute.") 
Since the claims and defenses asserted by the parties in this case arise out of the U.S. 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S; 1983 and the Idaho Tort Claims Act, I.C. 5 6-901 et. seq., the 
only attorney fees statutes which are applicable to the City's petition for allowance of 
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attorneys fees are Idaho Code 9 6-918A and 42 U.S.C. 3 1988. Idaho Code 5 12-117 does 
not apply. 
e. Issues of Causation and Mitigation of Damages Were Never 
Litigated or Decided, and are not a Proper Basis for 
Defendants' Attorney Pee Claims. 
In support of their claim for attorney fees, the City argues that BTA's allegation that 
Respondents' revocation of BTA's building permit caused loss of financing, and ultimately 
project failure, has no basis in fact. To support that argument, the City relies upon an 
affidavit executed by Rick Peterson and submitted in a case filed in federal district court 
against Washington Capital Management, Inc., a lender who had originally committed h d s  
to build the Boise Tower project. In this affidavit, Mr. Peterson states that the project was 
not built and BTA suffered damages as result of WCM's breach of its loan commitment. 
However, as the District C o w  clearly determined, this argument is totally without merit. 
First, the issue of whether the Respondents' conduct caused project failure and BTA's 
damage, was never litigated before the District Court. It was not the subject of either BTA's 
or the Respondents' motions for summary judgment, and it was not considered or decided in 
the District Court's summary judgment ruling. 
The issue of whether the Respondents' conduct caused project failure is extremely 
fact-intensive. BTA has never been afforded the opportunity to present the voluminous facts 
and testimony in support of its theory on this issue. Nevertheless, the fact that BTA has 
asserted damages against more than one defendant in different lawsuits does not mandate the 
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conclusion that BTA suffered no damage from the Respondents' actions. Idaho law 
specifically allows alternative pleadings and the same rationale applies to cases against 
different defendants. At best, the alternative claims go to mitigation of damages in either 
case. However, this case never reached that stage and BTA was never allowed to present its 
evidence on damages. This Court cannot possibly base its decision on the City's petition for 
attorneys' fees on a disputed fact-intensive issue which was never presented to the District 
Court, or considered or decided by it. As the District Court expressly held: 
Boise City made a decision to pursue summary judgment based 
on immunity and not other grounds. This was a calculated risk 
taken by Boise City and the Court is unwilling to speculate on 
what could have happened had the other issues been raised. 
Moreover, hypothetically speaking, simply because a party is 
able to mitigate the damages or the damages were minimal does 
not nullify the alleged wrong by the governmental entity. 
R. Vol. I, pp. 000132-000133. As such, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision 
denying attorney fees to the City and the City's request for attorney fees from this Court 
must be denied. 
Finally, as was set forth above, the standard of review for the grant or denial of an 
award of attorney fees is whether the District Court abused its discretion. In this case, the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order clearly demonstrates that the Court 
recognized the issue as one for its discretion. Further, the Decision demonstrates that the 
District Court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. Finally, the Decision clearly 
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demonstrates that the District court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. As such, 
the District Court's decision denying the City's claim for attorney fees must be affirmed. 
111. CONCLUSION. 
BTA request that the Court (a) reverse the denial by the District Court of its summary 
judgment motion and direct that partial summary judgment be entered that Hogland and the 
City are liable under 42 U.S.C.§1983 in depriving BTA of its procedural due process rights, 
reserving to trial the determination of the damages; (b) reverse the grant of summary 
jadgment dismissing the other claims of BTA, and (c) affirm the District Court's decision 
denying an award of attorney fees to the City and deny the City's request for fees on appeal. 
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